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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF REGULATING MILK
AS A PUBLIC UTILITY
HENRY S. MANLEY*

Any proposal for reducing competitive costs in the marketing of
New York State milk is a matter of tremendous concern to the people
of the State.
At the present moment the farmer is most concerned, because
present marketing conditions affect him most immediately and
severely. Thirteen years ago in this same State there was talk of a
milk famine, and the city dweller was most concerned. Ten years
before that, in 191o, although the farmer was then being paid about a
cent a quart more for his milk than he now is, it was asserted that he
was being paid less than the cost of production. In 1g9o Attorney
General O'Malley investigated the milk business and recommended
that it be regulated as a public service utility.' In 192o the same
recommendation was made by George Gordon Battle, Royal S. Copeland and Governor Alfred E. Smith.2 The present crisis has caused
the suggestion to be renewed.
Each swing of the pendulum, whether to low price or high, to
surplus or shortage, brings out the fact there are certain persistent and
expensive abuses in our system of marketing milk. At such a time it
is possible to lay aside our usual smugness about the "American
System" of Devil-take-the-hindmost, and consider whether the
abuses and costs of the competitive system do not out-weigh its benefits, at least relative to services and commodities which are universally essential to human existence.
We are familiar with the idea of the public service utility as applied
to railroads, busses, telephones, telegraphs, water companies,-gas and
electric companies. Nobody would think of returning to the day of
unrestricted competition in the serving of those public needs. At a
time of trouble in the milk industry we naturally consider the possible
application to it of the principles of public utility regulation. In
1920 the suggestion was advanced by the city dwellers, and now it is
by the dairymen; if making milk a public utility will eliminate wasteful competitive costs of marketing without introducing other costs as
great, all the public will gain by the change.
A strong argument can be made for the proposed change. If no
milk receiving plant could be set up or operated without first obtain*Counsel to New York State Department of Agriculture and Markets.
1
2
Senate Dor. No. 45 of I9IO.
Legis. Doc. No. 29 of 1920.
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ing a permit from some State agency, which has power to withhold
the permit if the proposed territory for the plant already has adequate
plant facilities, or if other plants already are supplying all the milk the
market requires, we shall have curbed the competition which has
caused so many unneeded and expensive plants to be erected and
operated. The same regulation can be applied to distributors of milk
and milk products. We may hope to see a fair price paid to the producer, and neither he nor the consumer will have the burden of
supporting two plants side by side, or a multiplicity of executive
organizations and sales forces. There is no more necessity for having
half-a-dozen milkmen rattle through the same city street than there
is for having it visited by half-a-dozen postmen; there is no more
necessity for having two or three milk gathering trucks operate along
the same country road than for having as many rural mail carriers.
Of course there is another side to the picture. You cannot give one
milk plant the monopoly of serving a township, or one milkman the
monopoly of serving a city block, without setting a limit upon
the profits to be made by the monopoly you have created. Pricefixing by government necessarily means price-fixing through political
processes. Many conservative people will be genuinely alarmed at
having the State government, or any other, attempt fixing the price
of any commodity, even such a prime essential as milk.
Proponents of the plan may urge that there is far more merit in
direct limitation by the government of wasteful competitive processes, than there is for leaving those processes running wild and
feeding them, on one side or the other of the struggle, many millions
of taxpayers' money, as recently has been done for wheat in the
United States and also in Canada. More remote and dubious arguments can be drawn from the tariff, ship subsidies, and other forms of
governmental interference in the competitive struggle. It can be
pointed out that this State, in the guise of emergency legislation,

regulated the price of coal and other fuels in
in

1922-1923,

and of rents

1920-1929.

Weighing those arguments, so far as they may determine the
wisdom of making milk a public utility, is not the present business.
It may be deemed wiser to enact some form of regulation not quite so
drastic, but even so, it is well to know where ihe constitutional limitation is drawn. Accordingly, this paper will take up the question
whether the due process clauses of the State and Federal constitutions
will permit milk to be made a public utility.
It is well established that the Legislature can regulate any business
or profession to the extent necessary to curb practices which are to
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the serious disadvantage of the general public. Likewise, it is well
established that the courts will jealously review such legislation when
it is challenged before them, and in any case where they believe
regulation has been carried beyond what is justified by the particular
public interest involved, they may determine that the regulatory
statute is unconstitutional. The judicial formula in such cases
usually is to say that the operation of the statute as applied to an
established business, takes without due process of law the property
used therein, or as applied to a person prohibited from entering the
business, it deprives him of liberty.
For many years admissions to practice medicine and the law have
been regulated. In the complexities of modem life it has been found
necessary to extend similar regulation to a great many other professions and businesses which require some special skill or capacity, or
expose the public to some special risk. In New York State today
there are half-a-hundred or more businesses in which a citizen cannot
engage unless he first persuades some official or board that he
possesses the requisite qualifications, and obtains a license or permit.
But it will be observed that any citizen possessing the appropriate
qualifications can insist upon being licensed, and it is doubtful if the
courts would sustain an arbitrary limitation of the persons licensed for
such a profession or business to those determined by the licensing
authority to be required by "public convenience and necessity".
That is a further degree in regulation, reserved for a limited class of
businesses which are called public utilities, and are commonly said to
be "affected with a public interest."
It is said that in colonial days, and in England at that time, it was
common for legislative bodies to fix prices for all important commodities. A very different philosophy has grown up under the Constitution of the United States, and of this State. It has come to be
accepted as the general rule, that so far as prices are concerned every
business is a law unto itself. The tavern, the ferry, the toll-bridge,
the toll-road, and the grist-mill probably were ancient exceptions
to that rule, and there have long been laws regulating the rate of
interest which may be charged on a loan. It was not until x877 that
our judiciary developed.the concept of a "public utility" as a generic
exception.
Shortly after 187o there spread through the middle west a movement which became known as the Grange. It was somewhat associated with the Greenback movement, and was largely a protest against
the unrestrained abuses of railroads, grain elevators, and other corporations. It succeeded in having passed by the Legislature of
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Illinois, and other states, laws fixing maximum fares and charges.
There was tremendous public interest in the legal battle which
followed. On March 1, 1877, the Supreme Court of the United States
sustained the laws fixing rates for railroads, and also the Illinois law
fixing the maximum charge which could be made by grain elevators.
The latter decision, Munn v. Illinois,' is recognized as a landmark in
constitutional law.
The court in deciding that case, pointed out that the grain elevator
business, established twenty years previously, had assumed immense
proportions, was practically a monopoly, and "stood in the very
gateway of commerce". The court said, "It is a business in which
the whole public has a direct and positive interest", and announced
the rule as follows:
"When one devotes his property to a use in which the public
has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an interest in
that use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for the
common good, to the extent of the interest he has thus created".
It was said at the time by dissenting judges, and has been repeatedmany times since, that the rule affords no adequate test for its application to other businesses, and indeed that it argues in a circle. Nevertheless, it has been applied to many businesses, new and old, and
utility regulation gradually has assumed the form with which we are
familiar today. The utility usually is given complete or partial
freedom from competition, its rates are limited to those which will
produce a "fair return", and it enjoys a judicial guarantee of minimum rates which will secure such a return.
There is no satisfactory definition of a public utility, and the degree
of regulation which is appropriate to one utility may be inappropriate
to another. Chief justice Taft stated the matter as follows:
"All business is subject to some kinds of public regulation, but
when the public becomes so peculiarly dependent upon a particular business that one engaging therein subjects himself to a
more intimate public regulation is only to be determined by the
process of exclusion and inclusion, and to gradual establishment of a line of distinction.****
"To say that a business is clothed with a public interest is not
to determine what regulation may be permissible in view of the
private rights of the owner. The extent to which an inn or a
cab system may be regulated may differ widely from that allowable as to a railroad or other common carrier. It is not a matter
of legislative discretion solely. It depends on the nature of the
business, on the feature which touches the public, and on
394 U. S. 113 (1876).
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the abuses reasonably to be feared. To say that a business is
clothed with a public interest is not to import that the public
may take over its entire management and run it at the expense of
the owner. The extent to which regulation may reasonably go
varies with different kinds of business. The regulation of rates
to avoid monopoly is one thing. The regulation of wages is
another. A business may be of such character that only the
first is permissible, while another may involve such a possible
danger of monopoly on the one hand, and such disaster from
stoppage on the other, that both come within the public concern
and power of regulation."
That quotation is from his opinion, unanimously concurred in, in
the case of Wolff Packing Co. v. Industrial Court.4 That decision
in 1923 held invalid a Kansas act attempting to fix wages paid by
packers and in certain other essential employments involving the production of food and clothing. The Supreme Court expressly left open
the question whether the preparation of food could be subjected to
regulation as a utility, because even if it could there was no justification for carrying regulation of such a business to the extent of fixing
wages.
The usual regulation characteristic of a public utility isto limit the
field to those given certificates of public convenience and necessity,
and to fix the prices at which they shall deal with the publi.- For
purposes of this inquiry into constitutional law it will be assumed
that such is the regulation to which it is desired to subject the business
of gathering and distributing milk.
Regulation to that extent has been sustained by the Supreme Court
of the United States as to common carriers of persons and goods,
grain elevators, stockyards, water companies, toll-roads, toll-bridges,
wharfs, ferries, insurance companies, banks, public warehouses,
electric companies, gas companies, oil pipe-lines, telephone companies
and telegraph companies. Recently it has been sustained as to
cotton-gins in Oklahoma5 and as to private contract motor carriers.'
The power to establish maximum charges for service has been sustained as to livestock commission merchants7 and as to insurance
agents." The same power has been denied as to theatre ticket brokers
U. S. 522, 538-539, 43 Sup. Ct. 630, 634 (1923).
Frost v. Corporation Comm., 278 U. S. 515, 49 Sup. Ct. 235 (1929).
'Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U. S. 251, 53 Sup. Ct. 181 (1932).
7
Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U. S. 42o, 50 Sup. Ct. 220
(1930).
8
0'Gorman & Young v. Hartford F. Ins. Co., 282 U. S. 251, 51 Sup. Ct. 130
(1931).
gTyson & Bro. v. Banton, 272 U. S. 418, 47 Sup. Ct. 426 (1927).
4262
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and as to employment agencies;1O similarly the power to limit profits
of gasoline selling companies has been denied." A statute attempting
to regulate as a public utility the ice business in Oklahoma, has been
12
held unconstitutional.
It is somewhat difficult to deduce from those cases any set rule as to
what characteristics justify classifying a business as a public utility.
Perhaps those cases merely illustrate the "process of exclusion and inclusion", of which Chief Justice Taft spoke, and have not yet accomplished the "establishment of a line of distinction." However,
already some points along the line can be made out.
Two characteristics almost invariably are found in connection with
any business regulated as a public utility. First, it supplies some
common necessity, so that the public generally is dependent upon it.
Probably all the businesses mentioned above, and many others, have
that characteristic, in varying degrees. 1' Second, its method of operation is such as to attain its greatest efficiency as a monopoly. Corporations supplying gas, electricity and water are not more essential
than those supplying coal' 4 or floutr 5 or gasoline 6 but a distinction can
be based upon their manner of doing business. A gas company, an
electric company, a water company, a common carrier, a telephone
company or a radio broadcasting company, because of the common
interests it serves and because of the manner in which it operates,
tends to become a monopoly through a bitter and expensive competitive struggle. It is a matter of experience that grain elevators,
warehouses, stockyards, grist-mills and cotton-gins frequently manifest the same tendency when located in a community which is greatly
dependent upon them. In the past the same evils have not been
experienced relative to common businesses such as the grocer, the
baker, and the butcher, who require a comparatively small outlay to
do business, and until the advent of the chain, those have displayed
no tendency towards monopoly.
Besides those two common characteristics of a public utility,
certain other characteristics when present in a business aid to the
1
°Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U. S. 350, 48 Sup. Ct. 545 (1928).
"'Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U. S. 235,49 Sup. Ct. II5 (1929).
uNew State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262, 52 Sup. Ct. 371 (1932).
3
See on this point Robinson, The Public Utility: A Problem in Social Engineering (1928) 14 CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY x, at 9; Robinson, The Public Utility in
American Law (1928) 41 HARV. L. REv. 277; Hamilton, Affectation With Public

Interest (1930) 39 YALE L. J. io89.
"SeeJones v. Portland, 245 U. S. 217, 38 Sup. Ct. 112 (1917).
"6See Green v. Frazier, 253 U. S. 233, 40 Sup. Ct. 499 (1920).
'8 See Standard Oil Co. v. Lincoln, 48 Sup. Ct. I55 (1927).
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conclusion that it may appropriately be subjected to such regulation. Third, the tendency of a business to peculiar abuses, such as
any business in which people put a special trust, either as to their
health or their property, tends to justify regulation of some sort,
which may the more readily take the form of utility regulation.
Fourth,if the business depends for its operation upon the possession of
special franchises, or the power of eminent domain, that fact strongly
tends to the conclusion that it may not complain if it is regulated as a
public utility. Mere use of the public highway for its profitable
business tends to the same conclusion. In Stephenson v. Binford,1
discussing a private contract motor carrier, the matter was stated as
follows:
"It is well established law that the highways of the State are
public property; that their primary and preferred use is for
private purposes; and that their use for purposes of gain is special
and extraordinary, which, generally at least, the Legislature may
prohibit or condition as-it sees fit."
All of those tests have some application to the business of gathering
and distributing milk.
There can be no doubt about its being a common necessity, so that
the public is dependent upon those engaged in the milk business. The
vast amount of legislation and litigation which have been expended
upon it speak eloquently of the public interest in milk. It is difficult
to conceive of a more essential commodity, unless it be water, and a
greater proportion of our citizens are dependent upon milk dealers
than are dependent upon a public water supply. Besides that dependence of our consuming population upon the milk business, our
agricultural population is as dependent upon the milk plant as the
pioneer was upon the grist-mill, as the farmers of Illinois were and
are upon the grain elevator, as the farmer of Missouri upon the stockyard, as the farmers of Kentucky upon the tobacco warehouse, and
as the farmers of Oklahoma upon the cotton gin.
The milk business operates in such a way as to attain its &eatest
efficiency as a monopoly, and has the tendency to become one. This is
not to say that it is now being monopolized in New York State; on
the contrary the milk business appears to be engaged in one of those
expensive and destructive struggles by which monopoly comes into
being. In other states the tendency of the milk business to monopoly
has been observed. The dairy companies of Colorado successfully
challenged the anti-trust law of that state, because it was too vague in
27Supra note 6 at 255, 53 Sup. Ct. at 184.
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terms. 18 Minnesota failed in its attempt to regulate unfair competition in cream buying because it did not, or could not, put into the
record evidence as to how the competition operated and how its
statute .would curb it. 19 In New York State in the past the milk
business has shown its monopolistic tendencies more obviously than
at the present time, and it should be possible for the Legislature to
act upon that experience, in reasonable anticipation of evils to come,
without exposing the citizens of this State to a complete repetition of
them.
The use which the milk business makes of the public highways
probably amounts to as much in quantity, even if it is somewhat
different in nature, from the use by the motor busses, the private
contract motor carriers, or the taxicabs. Aside from that use of the
highways there is nothing about the milk business requiring special
franchises or the right of eminent domain.
The possibilities for abuses which exist in the milk business are
numerous, and have resulted in its commonly being required to have
permits and licenses in connection with many of its instrumentalities.
The health of cattle is a matter of public concern, justifying drastic
regulation.20 Cow-barns are regulated. A milk plant operator must
give a bond and be licensed. This law was sustained in People v.
Perretta,21 and in his opinion Chief Judge Pound mentioned that there
are "conditions of the market peculiar to milk", and the law is designed not merely to protect the farmer, but "to keep open the stream
of milk flowing from farm to city." The plant manager must be
licensed, and so must the persons making fat tests and bacterial
counts, and they are required to report their tests and counts correctly, and keep certain records. There are numerous regulations
affecting every phase of the milk business, sanitary and economic,
from the time the cows are brought to the barn for milking to the
time the empty bottle is returned to the licensed milkman. One
dealer is forbidden to use, without permission, the marked bottles
and other equipment of another, and the constitutionality of that law
has been sustained.2 The milk business from beginning to end is
the most completely regulated business in existence, except the railllClinev. Frink Dairy Co., 247 U. S. 445,47 Sup. Ct. 68x

(1927).

' 9Fairmount Creamery Co. v. Minn., 274 U.S. 1, 47 Sup. Ct. 5o6 (1927); f.
State v. Central Lumber Co., 226 U. S. I57,33 Sup. Ct. 66 (1912) and O'Gorman
&Youngv. Hartford F. Ins. Co., 51 Sup. Ct., 130 (1931).
20
Peoplev. Teuscher, 248 N. Y. 454, i62 N. E. 484 (1928).
21253 N. Y. 305, 171 N. E. 72 (1930).
o
22
People v. Ryan, 23 App. Div. 252, 243 N. Y. Supp. 644 (4th Dept. 193o).
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roads. Making it a public utility may be a decided change in the form
of regulation, but it need not be a startling change in its extent.
In sustaining the constitutionality of a law under which the license
of a milk plant operator was revoked for over-reading the Babcock
test of cream purchased the Supreme Court of North Dakota said: s
"The creamery business is essentially a business which is
affected with a public interest, and as such is generally subject
to governmental regulation. * * * * The purpose of the statute,
indeed, is well known, and is to build up and to develop the dairying and stock raising industries of the state. It is to destroy the
unfair competition by which the financially stronger foreign
creameries, and butter and cheese and ice cream factories, may
destroy those of this state by overgrading or overmeasuring
until the local creameries are driven to bankruptcy, and then
control the grades and prices. * * * Licenses, indeed, may be
imposed not merely for the purpose of acting as temporary
permissions to engage in harmful occupations, but in order to so
control those that are useful that their operation may be harmless, and that they may really subserve the public good, which,
after all, is the basis of all property rights."
While the cases of FairmountCreamery Co. v. Minn.,? Williams v.
StandardOil Co.,2 and New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,2 all referred to
above, will requie careful study in connection with the proposal
to make the gathering and distribution of milk and milk products a
public utility, it is probable that such a statute, if the facts in justification of it are carefully made of record by a legislative report or
otherwise2 7willbe held by the courts to be constitutional.
At least three experiments along the line of making milk a public
utility have been attempted already. In November, 1931, the city of
Portland, Oregon, passed an ordinance requiring milk dealers to file
their prices with the city auditor, and to file all changes in price
seventeen days before they should be effective. Early in 1932 the
Province of Manitoba, Canada, amended its Public Utilities Act and
authorized the Public Utilities Board of the Province, in case of an
emergency when producers and distributors could not agree upon a
fair price for milk, to control the buying and selling of that commodity. The Board's power has been exercised by an order of September 2, 1932, establishing a $1.55 per hundred price for 3.5 milk in
2

Cofman v. Osterhaus, 4o N. D. 390, 4oo, 40i, i68 N. W. 826, 828, 829, I8
24Supra note i.
A. L. R. 219 (1918).
2
Supra note 12.
nSupra note ix.
27
See H. W. Bilke, Judicial Determinationof Questions of Fact Affecting Constitutional Validity of Legislative Action (1924) 38 HARv. L. REV. 6.
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Winnipeg area (an increase from less than a dollar a hundred before
the order) and establishing retail prices of ten cents a quart delivered,
or eight cents a quart at the stores.
In December, 1932, the Attorney General of Wisconsin advised the
commissioners of agriculture and markets of that state that their
power to regulate 'unfair trade practices' included power to fix
prices to producers for milk to be sold in fluid form within the city of
Milwaukee. By an order of December 27, 1932, the commissioners
fixed such prices.

